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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the short-run benefits of global trade and financial integration remain a matter of debate, there is broad consensus among economists and policymakers that the longer-run effects of trade liberalization can be substantial. By eliminating distorted incentives (to engage in rent-seeking activities, for instance), trade openness may lead to improved allocation of resources among sectors. By promoting competition in domestic markets, it may force domestic firms to improve the quality of their products: If a foreigner produces a better product that can be imported, domestic firms must make a better product at a lower price to keep selling their product at home. Reducing barriers to imports may also help to promote exports; increased competition from imports lowers the profits that firms can earn by focusing solely on the domestic market, and may increase incentives to export. By facilitating the acquisition of new inputs, intermediate goods, and improved technologies, and by increasing knowledge spillovers from more advanced trading partners, trade integration may also exert beneficial effects on productivity of the economy.
There is indeed broad empirical evidence indicating that trade openness has positive effects on productivity and economic growth; among recent studies are Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004) , , and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) . The latter study, in particular, found that over the 1950-98 period countries that liberalized their trade regimes experienced average annual growth rates that were about 1.5 percentage points higher than before liberalization. Post-liberalization investment rates rose 1.5-2 percentage points, whereas the average trade to GDP ratio increased by roughly 5 percentage points. 1 At the same time, however, there has been growing recognition that supply-side bottlenecks in developing countries (particularly the poorest ones) may seriously constrain the ability to reap the benefits from trade liberalization. In particular, the lack of basic transportation infrastructure (ports, roads, and airports) may prevent businesses from sending their goods abroad. Given the lumpy nature of these investments, and the difficulty of 1 They also noted, however, that there were large differences across countries. securing private financing in some countries (even in partnership with the public sector), this creates a prima facie role for governments to intervene. In turn, this raises the question of how governments should finance investments in infrastructure, given constraints on their budgetary resources and their ability to borrow abroad.
More generally, there is also new evidence that the benefits of trade openness for growth may depend not only on better access to core infrastructure services but also on the implementation of a wide range of complementary structural reforms-most notably in the area of labor markets, governance, and the business climate. This is well illustrated in a simple model by Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2009) , in which the growth effects of trade depend on the degree of labor market flexibility. Using cross-country, panel-data regressions, they found that the growth effect of openness may depend on a variety of structural characteristics. Specifically, they use nonlinear specifications that interact a proxy of trade openness with proxies of educational investment, financial depth, inflation stabilization, public infrastructure, governance, labor market flexibility, ease of firm entry, and ease of firm exit. They find all these interaction terms to be highly significant. Bolaky and Freund (2004) found similar results with respect to regulation. But if indeed governments should implement a wide range of reforms to fully reap the benefits from trade liberalization, the question that arises again is how the associated costs should be financed, in a context where domestic resources and external borrowing opportunities are limited. This paper analyzes the interactions between trade and complementary reforms, infrastructure constraints, and the need for "aid-for-trade" programs for developing economies-with particular attention to the current context of Caribbean countries. Despite achieving solid real GDP growth in recent years (averaging 3.6 percent annually over the period 1997-2006, see Table 1 ) the Caribbean region has not grown as fast as some comparable high performing developing countries. Although the region benefited for decades from the establishment of a variety of preferential trading arrangements with its major trading partner, its share of world trade has declined steadily since the early 1990s (see Tsikata and Pinto Moreira (2009) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes various arguments that have been offered to justify aid-for-trade (AFT) programs for developing economies. Section III discusses the relevance and implications of these various arguments for trade policy in Caribbean countries-particularly for some of the poorer countries in the region, where lack of public infrastructure remains a serious impediment to reaping the benefits from trade reform and spur growth. Section IV presents numerical experiments using a quantitative model for the Dominican Republic-a country where, despite its middle-income status, infrastructure indicators remain weak. The last section offers some concluding remarks.
II. TRADE REFORM AND THE RATIONALE FOR AID-FOR-TRADE PROGRAMS
Arguments in favor of AFT programs often center on five dimensions-all of which designed to help countries benefit fully from greater trade integration: (i) assistance to offset adjustment costs, such as fiscal support to help countries make the transition from tariffs to other sources of revenue; (ii) technical assistance; (iii) capacity building, including support for trade facilitation; (iv) institutional reform; and (v) investments in trade-related infrastructure.
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From an analytical standpoint, however, a more convenient analytical approach is to group these arguments under two headers: AFT as a "compensatory scheme" and AFT as a "promotion scheme." These sets of arguments are examined in turn.
Aid for Trade as a Compensatory Scheme
Arguments for AFT as a compensatory scheme can be grouped into two main rationales: mitigating revenue-induced cuts in productive expenditure, and mitigating adjustment and implementation costs.
Mitigating Revenue-induced Cuts in Productive Expenditure
Tariff revenues continue to be a major source of government income relative to the value-added tax and sales taxes in developing countries, particularly in the small, low-income ones (see, for instance, Bird and Zolt (2005) ). A key reason for this is that tariffs have proved to be an administratively efficient way of raising revenues in a context where human and physical resources are limited. Another has been the limited ability to raise revenues from other sources, as a result of a large informal sector and high rates of tax evasion.
Given this dependence, a key issue for many developing countries is the extent to which trade reform may lead to a reduction in revenues, and what these revenue losses may impose on the spending side of the budget.
Trade Reform and Tax Revenues
A reduction in tariffs, unaccompanied by compensatory fiscal measures, may lead to reduced government revenue in the short run. Over time, however, to the extent that lower tariffs lead to increased imports (that is, an expansion of the tax base) trade reform may increase government revenue. Higher revenues may also result from the fact that greater openness to trade leads over time to higher collection efficiency for other taxes, such as VAT (see Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006) ). In addition, if offsetting revenue measures (in the form of temporary higher taxes on other items, for instance), or reductions in spending are taken in parallel to cuts in tariffs, the adverse short-run effect may be mitigated.
Nevertheless, concerns about adverse revenue effects often figure prominently among explanations of a slow pace of trade liberalization (see Ebrill, Stotsky, and Gropp (1999) switching costs, but also a permanently higher administrative burden-which may be all the more important in countries with a large informal sector. 4 If so, then a cut in tariffs is unlikely to be revenue neutral.
The recent experience of developing countries suggests indeed that trade reforms have often been accompanied by revenue losses. In a study dwelling on data for 111 countries over 25 years, Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) found that high-income countries were able to recover from other sources the revenues that they had lost during previous episodes of trade liberalization. However, for middle-income countries, recovery was on average in the order of 45-60 cents for each dollar of lost trade tax revenue; and for low-income countries (which are those that depend the most on trade tax revenues, as noted earlier), recovery was, at best, no more than about 30 cents of each lost dollar. They also found no evidence that the presence of a value-added tax had, in itself, made it easier to cope with the revenue effects of trade liberalization. 5
Revenue Losses and Spending Cuts
A fall in revenues associated with a reduction in tariffs may force governments to implement concomitant cuts in expenditure in the short term. If these spending cuts take the form of reductions in social expenditure, they will have a direct effect on poverty, thereby 4 For instance, Emran and Stiglitz (2004) have shown that in developing countries with an informal sector in which, say, a VAT cannot be imposed, it is desirable to retain some trade taxes, e.g., to tax imports at a higher rate than domestic production.
5 By contrast, Agbeyegbe, Stotsky, and WoldeMariam (2006) , using panel data for 22 countries in SubSaharan Africa over 1980-96, found evidence that the relationship between trade liberalization and tax revenue is sensitive to the measure used to proxy trade liberalization. mitigating the welfare gains from trade-at least in the short term. There is some empirical evidence suggesting that this has indeed been the case in some countries (see Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) ).
There is also evidence to suggest that the loss of revenue has led not only to cuts in current spending but at times to significant cuts in public investment, most notably in the core public infrastructure (see Atolia (2007) ). Given the importance and broad range of externalities associated with public infrastructure (as discussed for instance by Agénor (2009)), a sustained loss in tariff revenue may have a sustained adverse effect on growth, which may greatly mitigate the benefits of greater openness. Moreover, the positive effect of public capital on the marginal productivity of private inputs may hold not only for infrastructure but also for other components of public spending and public capital-such as in education and health, which may both affect the productivity of labor and the ability to benefit from knowledge spillovers associated with greater trade. Thus, cuts in productive expenditure in general may be particularly damaging to growth. 
The Role of Aid
To the extent that trade liberalization may reduce trade-related revenue, that replacing lost tariff revenue with other sources may take time and may have high associated costs, and that revenue losses may have an adverse effect on productive public expenditure, tariff reforms may need to be accompanied by a temporary increase in aid. This will provide "breathing space" for governments to implement measures aimed at strengthening the domestic tax system (by reducing tax collection costs, fighting tax evasion, etc.) and other reforms on the expenditure side (such as improving the efficiency of public spending).
7 6 Other components of public spending, related for instance to the enforcement of property rights and maintenance of public order, could also increase productivity and exert a positive effect on private investment and growth, despite the fact that they may not be considered as being directly "productive."
7 Note also that aid may also affect incentives to control public spending and collect taxes. An increase in aid may lead to a decline in public savings through lower tax revenues, as governments reduce their tax collection effort. This is one of the issues addressed in the "fiscal response" literature dealing with aid; see, for instance, McGillivray (2009) . Alternatively, as documented by Chatterjee, Giuliano, and Kaya (2007) , increases in aid may translate into a shift in the composition of government spending away from investment and toward
Mitigating Adjustment Costs and Implementation Costs
The relative price adjustments that accompany (or precede) trade liberalization often entail large intersectoral movements in resources; firms may incur sizable adjustment costs as a result of these movements. While it may take some time for the gains from trade to materialize (as they often depend on reform in other areas), adjustment costs tend to be "paid" upfront.
For some countries, these adjustment costs (which include not only higher rates of unemployment in import-competing sectors but also pressures on the balance of payments and fiscal accounts) may be particularly significant. Even by spreading adjustment costs over a relatively long implementation period (say, 10 to 15 years), some countries may have limited capacity to bear them.
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There are also costs associated with the implementation of the regulatory reforms that are part of trade agreements.
9 While tariff reductions are relatively easy to implement, regulatory changes (customs reform, intellectual property rights, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures) may impose a significant burden (at least in the short term) compared to the immediate benefits that countries may reap from new market access opportunities. For instance, these regulatory changes may require higher expenditure on system design and drafting of legislation, capital expenditure on buildings and equipment, personnel training, as well as improvements in administration and enforcement capability. For some of the poorest countries, the extent of reform of administrative systems that is required to meet agreed standards may be overwhelming.
consumption. In turn, reduced incentives to mobilize domestic resources, or shifts away from productive spending, may mitigate the benefits of sustained increases in aid for economic growth.
Thus, although implementation costs are hard to quantify, there is a risk that changes in the regulatory environment that are mandated by trade agreements draw money away from development budgets (and possibly from more productive uses), as pointed out by Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) in a broader context. The role of aid in this context is not only to mitigate job losses in areas most adversely affected by trade liberalization, or to help those who have lost their jobs obtain alternative employment (as is commonly argued), but also to mitigate the risk that the implementation of the regulatory agreements that are required as part of trade arrangements may lead to "resource diversion," a cut in productive expenditures, and thereby an adverse effect on growth in the longer run.
Aid for Trade as a Growth-Promoting Scheme
In addition to being viewed as a "compensatory" mechanism, aid may be designed to help countries realize the full benefits of new market opportunities. In that perspective, the first argument is that aid may help countries invest in basic infrastructure (not only at the national but also possibly at the regional level), so as to alleviate supply-side constraints. The second is that it may help to support capacity building and strengthen the institutional environment in which trade reform is being implemented. The third is that it may help to support structural reforms that are complementary to trade liberalization, such as labor market reforms and regulatory reforms.
Facilitating Domestic and Regional Investment in Core Infrastructure
It is now well recognized that market access, on its own, is not sufficient to bring the benefits of trade; in many cases, countries are unable to take significant advantage of new trading opportunities because their supply capacity and competitiveness are limited. In particular, as discussed in more detail in Box 1, poor transport infrastructure can prevent local farmers from accessing domestic markets and international ports; poor storage facilities can increase inventory costs; and inadequate energy and water supplies can disrupt production or increase costs. Some countries need to invest in the necessary exporting infrastructure (e.g. efficient ports, adequate roads, reliable electricity and communications) to stimulate private investment in productive capacity. Thus, by supporting domestic infrastructure investment, AFT programs may foster the ability of the private sector to take advantage of new trade opportunities, improve competitiveness of domestic products, and more generally enhance the role of private activity in promoting development.
Box 1. The Gains from Trade and Access to Infrastructure
From the perspective of external trade performance (as opposed to growth per se), improved access to infrastructure is critical for most developing countries who intend to reap the benefits from trade. There are three specific channels through which infrastructure can impinge on trade performance: through transportation costs, the quality of the labor force, and adjustment costs to tariff cuts.
From the perspective of international trade, the reduction in production costs that improved infrastructure may lead to is the most direct effect. Eliminating infrastructure constraints, such as water shortages, electricity outages and difficult road access, can facilitate the process of shifting private resources to more productive sectors, for instance from nontradables to tradables, or from agriculture to services and manufacturing. In addition, by facilitating movement of people and goods, improved infrastructure can lead in the medium term to higher investments in the rural sector and greater agricultural diversification, by raising expected rates of return. Farmers must be able to obtain inputs at reasonable costs, and also to sell their outputs at remunerative prices. Transportation costs, in particular, are crucial for them to decide whether or not to engage in certain activities.
Several studies have indeed documented the importance of good infrastructure for trade and export performance. In a study conducted in the late 1990s, the African Development Bank found that freight charges on exports of the poor countries of the region to the United States, as a proportion of CIF value, are on average 20 percent higher than for comparable products from other low-income countries. Yoshino (2007) found that poor quality of public infrastructure-measured in terms of the average numbers of days per year for which firms experience disruptions in electricity-has an adverse effect on exports in sub-Saharan Africa. In Rwanda, farmers receive only 20 percent of the price of their coffee as it is loaded onto ships in Monbasa; the other 80 percent disappear into the costs of poor roads (as well as red tape) between Rwanda and Kenya. High domestic and international transport costs have also been identified as a key impediment to export growth in South Africa (see Naudé and Matthee (2007) ). De (2008 De ( , 2009 found that transport costs and the quality of infrastructure are a key component of trade costs for several Asian countries, including China.
Regarding Latin America and the Caribbean, a study by the Inter-American Development Bank suggests that for many countries of the region shipping costs (which depend significantly on port efficiency) may be a greater barrier to U.S. markets than import tariffs (see Micco and Pérez (2002) ). Moreover, a comparative study by Dollar et al. (2006) of four countries in Latin America (Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru) and four Asian countries (Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan) found that inadequate access to core infrastructure services is one of the key factors that explains the more rapid pace of international trade integration in the latter group of countries.
A possible mechanism through which infrastructure may affect positively exports is through foreign direct investment (FDI); for Latin America in particular, there is indeed evidence suggesting that FDI flows are positively related to the availability of infrastructure services (as measured by the number of telephone lines per capita; see Nunes, Oscategui, and Peschiera (2006) .
Another way through which infrastructure may enhance trade performance relates to its external effects on human capital. To the extent that, as discussed by Agénor (2009) , core infrastructure exerts positive effects on health and education outcomes, improved access to infrastructure services can generate significant benefits for export activities in terms of a more productive/higher quality labor force.
Moreover, if infrastructure capital enhances the degree of complementarity between skilled labor and physical capital, it will also increase private incentives to invest in the accumulation of knowledge. This may in turn create new opportunities for trade (by opening up new areas of specialization) and economic growth.
Finally, a third channel through which infrastructure may enhance trade performance is by mitigating adjustment costs associated with reductions in tariffs and the loss of protection for some industries. When tariffs are reduced, importcompeting firms must reduce their production in the face of new competition, causing some of their workers to become redundant and their capital to lie idle for a period. In addition, as resources are moved from one sector to another, firms may incur adjustment costs-that is, frictions that prevent firms from adjusting their labor force and capital stock fully and instantaneously in response to the change in relative prices associated with trade reform.
Improved access to infrastructure may reduce these costs by facilitating the movement of resources to those (tradable) sectors where relative prices have improved. Moreover, by lowering not only production costs (at a given level of the stock of capital) but also adjustment costs related to investment, improved provision of infrastructure services will tend to raise expected rates of return and therefore stimulate private capital formation. And by enhancing the ability of the private sector to respond to price signals, lower adjustment costs may be accompanied by efficiency gains, which may translate into permanent growth effects. All these effects may help to explain why, as noted in the introduction, recent studies such as Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2009) found that improved access to infrastructure magnifies the gains from trade liberalization.
In addition, AFT is particularly important to foster the development of regional public goods in infrastructure. In addition, for regions where countries are relatively small, size is an important incentive for governments to pool resources for the provision of efficient, cost-effective common services. This is a particularly important consideration for a region like the Caribbean, where many observers have argued that coordination failures have created a gap in the optimal provision of regional public goods (see CARICOM (2007) ). In such cases, regional investments in core infrastructure, supported by foreign grants, may generate potentially large returns. 
Supporting Capacity Building and Institutional Reform
When implementing trade reforms, capacity building and institutional reforms are essential in a range of areas. As noted earlier, strengthening tax administration and enforcement capability is essential in the medium term to mitigate the impact of tariff reductions on revenues. In addition, countries often lack the necessary technology and knowledge to meet product standards prevailing in high value markets (sanitary measures, technical barriers, certification, etc.). Assistance to build supply capacity may involve fostering the development of a favorable business climate to help private sector enterprises capitalize on new trade opportunities and identifying infrastructure bottlenecks (Dollar et al. (2006) ). In turn, this may entail removing the obstacles that ineffective institutions place on the ability of firms with high export potential to grow-by developing for instance more effective customs authorities, more accountable policing, and more efficient port authorities.
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To benefit fully from trade liberalization, developing countries may also need to strengthen regional institutions. A well-designed AFT program, which avoids the "diversion risk" alluded to above, may promote all these objectives.
Financing Complementary Structural Reforms
To achieve their full impact, trade reforms often need to be accompanied by complementary structural reforms. It is well recognized, for instance, that the need to invest in educational programs that enhance competitiveness and support diversification, by allowing workers (particularly those who lose their jobs in import-competing industries) to "retool" and adjust their skills to those required in the expanding sectors. More generally, there is good analytical and empirical evidence suggesting that trade liberalization has stronger beneficial effects when labor markets are more flexible (see Oslington (2005) and the survey by Hoekman and Winters (2005) ).
However, the need for complementary reforms may involve not only the labor market but also the financial sector (see Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2009) ). In countries with underdeveloped financial sectors, inadequate access to finance-whether to finance shortterm capital needs or physical investment-is a major factor inhibiting exports. Difficulties in assessing the creditworthiness of (and the value of collateral pledged by) small exporting firms, in particular, may constrain access to formal sector loans, with an adverse effect on employment. Again, a well-designed AFT may help to alleviate these constraints.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE REFORM IN THE CARIBBEAN
As noted in the introduction, the ongoing debate on AFT programs for developing economies has important implications for Caribbean countries, given the importance of the structural and budgetary constraints that the region faces in attempting to revive its trade reform agenda and take advantage of new opportunities offered by the global trade environment. This section begins by reviewing the relevance of AFT arguments presented earlier; it then discusses some issues that are specific to the region.
Relevance of Aid-for-Trade Arguments
Consider first the arguments that view AFT as a compensatory scheme. The first two arguments (the need to mitigate revenue losses and avoid cuts in productive expenditure) are highly relevant for Caribbean countries in the present context. Some of these countries rely quite heavily on trade taxes as a source of current revenue. In particular, the six Eastern technical, health, and quality standards pertaining to food production and marketing (agricultural goods, fish and fish products, etc.). 13 Compliance with these (at times very demanding) standards will impose a significant burden on governments in the region; to ensure that resources are not diverted from other productive uses, an AFT program may be essential. This need is well recognized in the EPA.
14 Other arguments that can be used to justify an AFT program as a promotion scheme are also highly relevant for Caribbean countries. As discussed in more detail in World Bank Table 2 , although some countries in the region display infrastructure indicators that compare favorably with other successful developing countries in other regions, some countries (including the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Haiti) continue to suffer from large "infrastructure gaps."
Furthermore, reaping the full benefits of trade reforms in terms of productivity and growth may require complementary reforms in many of these countries. In particular, the 13 The EPA, negotiated in individual regional groupings, replaces the Cotonou Agreement signed between the EU and ACP countries from January 1, 2008. The agreement also indicates that the EU will assist CARIFORUM States in establishing harmonized intra-regional sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards. See European Commission, "Economic Partnership Agreement Between the CARIFORUM States, of the One Part, and the European Community, and Its Member States, of the Other Part.
14 The EPA also includes provisions to provide technical assistance for tax reforms aimed at reducing CARIFORUM States' reliance on trade taxes. flexibility of labor markets and the business climate must be significantly improved (see World Bank (2008)). Thus, from that perspective, there is a strong case for increased assistance to Caribbean countries, in the form of grants or loans (with disbursements perhaps over a 4-5 year horizon), to cover a wide range of needs-from investments in infrastructure (at both the domestic and regional levels), to capacity building and institutional reform, and support for complementary structural reforms, notably in the area of labor markets-to alleviate key obstacles to trade expansion. The EPA recently concluded with the European Union recognizes these needs. In Part I, Article 8 states that development co-operation shall be primarily focused on the following areas: (i) The provision of technical assistance to build human, legal and institutional capacity in the CARIFORUM States so as to facilitate their ability to comply with the commitments set out in the Agreement; (ii) The provision of assistance for capacity and institution building for 
Some Specific Issues for the Region
Although there are a number of arguments in favor of a comprehensive AFT program for Caribbean countries, there are also several issues that need to be kept in mind in designing such a program to ensure that it brings the benefits expected. The first relates to a possible "additionality" problem. The second refers to the mechanism through which aid should be delivered and monitored. The third relates to the possibility that large increases in traderelated aid may generate Dutch disease effects. Finally, the fourth relates to the possibility that aid flows may remain highly volatile, hampering the ability of Caribbean countries to design medium-term investment programs.
The "Additionality" Problem
Although there seems to be convergence regarding the benefits of an AFT program for Caribbean countries, it is important to ensure that this translates into the allocation of additional resources to support trade. In the EPA concluded in December 2007 with the European Union, for instance, no specific mechanism for new aid is projected. The risk is that aid allocated to promote trade may substitute for other allocations of aid, some with potentially higher return in terms of growth and welfare-such as education and health. This new "aid additionality" problem needs to be carefully monitored. Caribbean. 16 The IF is intended to ensure that aid for trade corresponds to country priorities and focuses on poverty reduction. From that perspective, it is important to view AFT not only as a mechanism for transfers to compensate for losses but also (as argued earlier) as a development tool, designed to ensure that the root causes of weak supply response and lagging export performance are addressed.
However, ensuring that trade is adequately integrated into broader growth and development strategies, remains a challenge in the region. For the poorest countries in the Caribbean (such as Guyana and Haiti), for which the international community makes external assistance conditional on the elaboration of an explicit Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), it is essential to enhance their ability to bring trade needs into the PRS process. Doing so would allow these countries to generate additional resources, to address infrastructure constraints, the lack of human capital, and so on. (2008)).
For the richer countries in the Caribbean, donors should also ensure that AFT assistance is linked with broader development programs and complements or strengthens a country's own plans, budgets, and structures. However, monitoring is more difficult in the case of these countries because they are not, in a sense, "required" to develop an explicit development strategy.
Regarding the form that aid should take, it is clear that for the poorest and least creditworthy countries in the Caribbean, direct grants to governments (in the form of additional contributions from ODA budgets) will continue to be the primary means of addressing development needs-particularly for lumpy investments in infrastructure, education, and health. Richer countries of the region, however, have limited access to ODA grant resources and concessional lending. Non-concessional lending (through multilateral institutions, in particular) and equity investment will therefore be key in addressing the region's trade-related capacity and infrastructure needs. From that perspective, AFT grants may be viewed as providing crucial "seed money" for larger infrastructure programs and other supply-side interventions (such as the creation of lending institutions to finance exportoriented investments) that require non-concessional financing or "blending" with donor assistance.
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Dutch Disease Effects
Assuming that there is no additionality problem, and that an AFT program translates into a sizable increase in aid flows, an important issue that Caribbean countries may need to address is whether an increase in these flows may paradoxically have unintended negative consequences for trade-through a Dutch disease effect. The argument, essentially, is that if aid is at least partially spent on nontraded goods, it may put upward pressure on domestic prices and lead to a real exchange rate appreciation. In turn, a real appreciation may induce a reallocation of labor toward the nontraded goods sector, thereby raising real wages there in terms of the price of tradable goods. The resulting deterioration in competitiveness may lead to a decline in export performance, unsustainable current account deficits, and eventually an adverse effect on growth.
The international evidence does suggest that aid may lead to real exchange rate appreciation, and thereby reduce international competitiveness, in the short run. However, if aid raises public investment in infrastructure, then the longer-run effect on the real exchange rate may be depreciation. A possible reason is the positive supply-side effects that are associated with improved access to public infrastructure or health services, financed by the increase in aid. 19 These effects tend to develop gradually, in contrast to the demand-side effects of aid. Put differently, once dynamic considerations are taken into account, the Dutch project?" This has important implications for the allocation of aid, to the extent that trade-offs may emerge regarding the effect of various components on growth. 18 For richer countries of the region, with some existing industrial capacity, donors should devote greater attention to the private sector, and attempt to implement programs that act as catalysts and facilitators for enterprises to establish themselves, grow, adopt technology, acquire finance, and reach international markets.
19 See Agénor et al. (2008) and Agénor and Yilmaz (2008) for a more detailed discussion.
"disease" does not have to be a terminal illness; longer-run, supply-side effects may eventually outweigh short-term, adverse demand-side effects on the real exchange rate. It is therefore important for Caribbean countries to ensure that an AFT program includes a significant component of spending allocated to productive uses. At the same time, ensuring that adequate attention is paid to other, nonprice aspects of competitiveness (such as product standards, etc.) is also important.
Aid Volatility
Finally, a possible concern for trade reform in Caribbean countries relates to aid volatility. This is a general issue associated with aid, as documented in a number of recent studies. 20 Of course, by their very nature, some types of aid (such as emergency aid or, to a lower extent, program aid) should indeed exhibit a high degree of volatility. By contrast, project aid should be relatively stable, given that it is designed to promote (directly or indirectly) investment in physical and human capital. Volatility in that category of aid could make it difficult for recipient governments to formulate a medium-term AFT-related investment program to support trade reform and spur growth. In the specific context of Caribbean countries (especially among the poorest ones), it is therefore important to ensure that any AFT initiative that involves a sizable increase in spending on trade-related infrastructure makes aid flows predictable over the medium term, to secure sustained commitment in the region. In the current context of a global financial crisis and severe budgetary pressures in all major donors, this may unfortunately be difficult to achieve.
20 Bulir and Hamann (2006) and Hudson and Mosley (2007) have found that the volatility of aid is much larger than the volatility of domestic tax revenues. Both studies also found that aid volatility has actually increased since the late 1990s, as does Kharas (2007) for a large group of aid recipients. See Agénor and Aizenman (2009) for a more detailed discussion.
IV. AID FOR TRADE, TRADE REFORM, AND GROWTH: ILLUSTRATIVE EXPERIMENTS FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
To illustrate how AFT programs may condition the benefits of trade reforms and their impact on economic growth, a dynamic model of the Dominican Republic is used in this section. 21 Although the Dominican Republic is among the richest countries of the region, and therefore among those that are not necessarily in the best position to benefit from a large AFT program to accompany the EPA recently signed by Caribbean countries with the European Union, its infrastructure indicators remain relatively weak (see Table 2 ); the "infrastructure argument" in favor of an AFT program as a compensatory scheme is thus highly relevant.
Thus, the model helps to illustrate the importance of complementing trade reforms with productive government spending, in a context where infrastructure constraints (in addition to implementation costs) are significant, to enhance their effect on growth.
The next subsection provides a brief discussion of the model. The baseline scenario for the period 2000-20 is then characterized and several policy experiments, involving changes in tariffs and in aid flows, are presented.
The Quantitative Framework
The model used to analyze the impact of trade reform and aid programs in the Dominican Republic is a one-sector, one-household model, which does not therefore allow an analysis to address issues related to the sectoral impact of a trade agreement and its implications for income distribution. 22 Accounting for these allocative effects is of course 21 The analysis in this section was conducted in close collaboration with staff from the Ministry of the Economy, Planning, and Development in the Dominican Republic, to whom the Team expresses its sincere gratitude. 22 More precisely, the model is a SPAHD framework built at the country's Ministry of the Economy, Table 3 Because most products exported by the Dominican Republic already enter duty free in the European Union, the reduction in EU tariffs is assumed to have only a marginal effect on the country's export prices; specifically, we assume that export prices (measured in foreigncurrency terms) increase permanently by about 0.2 percentage points, starting in 2008.
Baseline Scenario
Base Experiment: Tariff Loss Compensated by higher Indirect Taxes
The first experiment assumes that the fall in tariff revenues is entirely offset by an immediate increase in indirect taxes. The impact of this policy on the economy is illustrated in Table 4 , in terms of deviations from the baseline scenario. As can be expected, the effect on growth is negligible, whereas both exports and nonoil imports increase slightly as a share of GDP.
Aid as a Temporary Compensation Scheme
The second experiment assumes that the fall in tariff revenues is initially offset by an increase in aid, with domestic taxation implemented subsequently. Specifically, the fall in tariff revenues is assumed to be compensated by an increase in foreign grants by the same amount, that is, 0.4 percentage points of GDP, for three years (2008 to 2010), and by an offsetting increase in the indirect tax rate starting in 2011, and kept constant after that.
The impact of this policy on the economy is illustrated in Table 5 . The inflow of capital associated with the increase in aid leads (after a year) to a small real appreciation, which dampens the expansion of real exports and stimulates imports. The net effect is a deterioration of the trade balance during the initial phase of adjustment. Nevertheless, the 23 Oil imports are not taxed in the Dominican Republic.
current account improves slightly at first, due to the increase in aid flows. The real appreciation exerts a slight positive effect on output growth (due to the reduction in the domestic price of imported oil) and employment, but this effect is short lived.
Aid as a joint Compensation-Promotion Scheme
In the next set of experiments, aid is assumed to not only compensate for the tariff loss during 2008-10, as in the previous case, but also to increase for four years, starting in 2009, by 2 percentage points of GDP, to finance public investment. The idea here is that the lack of public capital is a key constraint on the ability to capitalize on new trade opportunities, and that aid can play a critical role in alleviating these constraints.
In the first variant of this experiment, the allocation of public investment between infrastructure, education, and health, remains the same as in the baseline scenario; thus, only the level of public investment is affected. The results are illustrated in Table 6 . They indicate that the impact on growth is quite substantial-real GDP per capita increases at a rate of 2. However, the real appreciation associated with the inflow of aid translates within a year into a fall in the share of exports into GDP as well as a large increase in the share of total imports in GDP. As a result, the trade balance deteriorates quite significantly during the first few years of the adjustment process.
In the second variant of this experiment, the increase in aid is assumed to be allocated totally to an increase in public investment in infrastructure. As a result, the share of public 24 The results also show that the "growth dividend" tapers off over time. This, of course is very much because of the nature of the experiment. It could also be assumed that over time, as the increase in aid is removed, a tax reform or a reallocation of expenditure (from current spending to investment) is implemented to allow a sustained increase in public capital accumulation. investment allocated to infrastructure goes up temporarily (until 2012) from about 56 percent in the baseline to 68.5 percent in this scenario. The results are illustrated in Table 7 . The implications for growth and trade flows are similar to those presented in the previous tables.
Finally, as an alternative to this experiment, instead of assuming that aid increases for four years by 2 percentage points of GDP and decreases abruptly back to its baseline value, it is assumed that the reduction is gradual-after going up by 2 percentage points of GDP in 2009 and 2010, it drops to 1.5 percent in 2011, 1 percent in 2012, 0.5 percent in 2013, and back to baseline value after that. Results obtained with fixed allocation shares of public investment are reported in Table 8 ; they are qualitatively similar to those reported earlierwith the difference that the impact on growth and trade flows is more persistent, as could be expected.
25
It is important to stress that the experiments reported above are illustrative in nature.
Nevertheless, they provide a good sense of the potential benefits of an AFT program associated with a trade agreement-even for a middle-income country. Indeed, even as a compensation scheme, a temporary increase in aid can be helpful, to the extent that it mitigates the direct effect of changes in taxation on the cost of living. From both the welfare and political economy perspectives, this may be an important consideration to ensure the sustainability of trade reforms. Moreover, if external support can also be provided to finance increases in public investment aimed at alleviating supply bottlenecks, domestic producers may be better able to capitalize on new trade opportunities. 25 Results obtained with the increase in aid allocated only to infrastructure are not reported here to save space but they are also qualitatively similar to those reported earlier.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this paper was to examine how aid-for-trade (AFT) programs can help to magnify the growth benefits that developing countries can reap from trade reform and global integration, with a special emphasis on the Caribbean region. The first part discussed various rationales for trade-related aid, grouped for analytical convenience into those that view AFT as a compensatory scheme (aimed at alleviating the adverse effects of trade liberalization, by cushioning the impact of revenue cuts and mitigating the adjustment costs that are typically associated with trade reform) and those that view it as a promotion scheme (aimed at alleviating the supply-side constraints that constrain the ability of firms to take advantage of lower tariffs and improved relative price signals). In that context, the evidence on the impact of trade reforms on tax revenues, and possible adverse effects of revenue losses on public expenditure, was also examined.
In discussing aid as a promotion scheme, particular attention was paid to the role of infrastructure as a constraining factor on trade expansion. It was argued that there are a number of ways through which inadequate access to infrastructure can prevent countries from reaping the full benefits from greater trade integration. This is corroborated by recent empirical studies based on cross-country, panel-data regressions, such as Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2009) , which shows indeed that improved access to public infrastructure magnifies the impact of trade openness on economic growth. Also in line with the evidence, it was also pointed out that other complementary reforms may be needed to enhance the gains from trade liberalization-including increased labor market flexibility, better governance, and an improved regulatory environment. Thus, if domestic fiscal imbalances limit the ability of governments to finance a comprehensive agenda involving not only trade liberalization but also some critical complementary reforms, a temporary aid program may be essential to maximize the long-run benefits of openness.
The second part of the paper discussed the relevance of AFT arguments for Caribbean countries and identified a number of specific issues for the region. It was noted that most of these arguments are highly relevant in the current context of these countries. In particular, it was noted that the ability of many firms from the region to compete in world markets is undermined by the absence or inadequacy of infrastructure services and a weak institutional environment. Furthermore, in many of these countries, reaping the full benefits of trade reforms in terms of productivity and growth will require significant complementary reforms, especially in the area of labor markets. Several issues specific to the design and implementation of AFT programs in the context of Caribbean countries were also discussedincluding "additionality" problems; the mechanism through which aid should be delivered and monitored; the possibility that large increases in trade-related aid may translate into Dutch disease effects; and the risk that aid flows may remain highly volatile, hampering the ability of domestic governments to design multi-year investment programs-thereby reducing incentives to implement other critical reforms.
The third part of the paper illustrated the potential growth effects of temporary AFT programs associated with trade reform, with simulation results for the Dominican Republica country where infrastructure indicators remain relatively weak, compared to others at similar levels of income. Several scenarios were considered, with temporary increases in aid being viewed as both compensatory and promotion schemes, and with alternative assumptions about the speed of tax reform aimed at offsetting a drop in tariffs. Although illustrative in nature, the results illustrate the potentially large growth benefits that a temporary and welltargeted AFT program can provide to countries of the region. In particular, if external support can be provided to finance increases in public investment aimed at improving access to core infrastructure, thereby alleviating supply bottlenecks, domestic producers may be better able to capitalize on new trade opportunities.
The broad policy implication of this paper is thus that, given that for many countries in the Caribbean reaping the benefits of greater openness will require that complementary reforms and policies be implemented prior to (or in conjunction with) trade reform, and given weak fiscal positions to begin with, a temporary aid program may be essential. Failure to provide assistance could hamper the ability of Caribbean countries to respond to the opportunities that recent measures of trade liberalization and integration can bring. At the same time, although trade integration is a key determinant of long-run growth for all countries in the region, there are important differences among them that need to be considered in designing an AFT program for each individual country. In doing so, an important question that needs to be addressed is to what extent specific countries can absorb potentially large inflows of foreign aid, given their potential adverse effects-real exchange rate appreciation (Dutch Disease) and disincentive effect on tax collection (moral hazard). Another critical issue is to ensure that AFT programs are well coordinated with national development plans and strategies. The success of an AFT agenda will require therefore careful planning at the individual country level.
